The Rise of the US Military’s Clandestine Foreign War Apparatus

Stanley McChrystal, past a two-star awesome general, was nan astir important fig successful this gyration successful subject affairs. McChrystal, a West Point postgraduate and nan boy of a distinguished general, had risen done nan ranks successful nan 75th Ranger Regiment and was groomed for immoderate of nan Army’s astir delicate missions. Smart, shrewd, charismatic, and press-savvy, McChrystal first came to prominence arsenic a Pentagon spokesman, and successful 2003, was tapped to lead achromatic ops JSOC, which until past had been relegated to important but constricted roles. Consistent pinch nan accent laid connected psychological operations successful nan Special Forces, nan astir important warfighting invention that McChrystal developed while serving successful this position was not chiefly tactical aliases strategical but ideological and mediatic.

Although location were comparatively fewer overseas fighters successful Iraq and astir came from neighboring Syria, McChrystal was nan superior proponent of nan view, speedy to dispersed among Washington policymakers, that nan force was not a nationalist rebellion against extracurricular occupation, but 1 node of a world conspiracy of America-hating terrorists. To picture this nebulous and inherently malignant foe, McChrystal and his unit invented nan word “al-Qaeda successful Iraq” aliases AQI. At nan apical of this dubious organization, which they themselves had done much than anyone other to conjure into being, JSOC analysts placed nan dopey Jordanian criminal Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a mysterious Bedouin bogeyman, overmuch hyped by diplomatic Pentagon spooks successful nan runup to nan war, who whitethorn not person moreover been successful Iraq astatine nan time. To explicate distant nan paucity of tangible contacts betwixt insurgents successful Iraq and Osama bin Laden’s organization, nan remnants of which were now scattered astir Pakistan and Yemen, McChrystal and his aides redefined al-Qaeda arsenic a concentric grouping of decentralized “franchises” operating connected a “blind compartment model.”

In his memoir, McChrystal admits pinch singular if belated frankness that JSOC produced intelligence assessments “that inflated al-Qaeda’s role,” and “problematically utilized ‘AQI’ arsenic a catchall nickname for immoderate Sunni group that attacked Americans.” This narrative, he acknowledges, was a measurement to “sidestep nan reality” that astir Iraqi insurgents were chiefly motivated by “earthly grievances,” not Islamist ideology. There’s nary indication, however, that he shared these important caveats pinch President Bush, who seized upon nan imaginary influx of overseas jihadists into Iraq arsenic an after-the-fact vindication of his discredited lawsuit for war. By grossly exaggerating Zarqawi’s importance, McChrystal and his deputy, Vice Admiral William McRaven, convinced nan Bush management that it was imaginable for nan United States to termination its measurement to triumph successful Iraq done a massively stepped-up run of targeted assassinations. This was an basal precondition for nan emergence of JSOC.

Another of nan advisors whom Bush called upon to reformulate nan warfare effort successful precocious 2006 was Michael Vickers, nan apical Pentagon charismatic successful complaint of nan larger umbrella statement complete JSOC, nan Special Operations Command, aliases SOCOM, known by nan comically unwieldy acronym “ASD SO/LIC & IC,” for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. In his memoir, Vickers recalls really nan Bush management scrapped its existing playbook and instituted a caller argumentation that put JSOC firmly successful complaint of nan conflict successful Iraq.

The scheme progressive a two-pronged approach, nan public-facing facet of which was a impermanent buildup aliases “surge” of accepted forces. But nan existent escalation took spot down nan scenes, arsenic JSOC was softly tasked pinch implementing a radically expanded run of wide assassinations very akin to nan Vietnam-era Phoenix Program, which successful spite of nan repugnance it had elicited successful nan public, was considered a occurrence by nan Washington-dwelling national-security set. Once constricted to erstwhile authorities officials and leaders of nan insurgency, JSOC’s deed list, euphemistically known arsenic nan “disposition matrix” aliases “joint prioritized effects list,” grew exponentially to see anyone, nevertheless youthful aliases peripheral, suspected of taking up arms against American occupiers. Vickers calls this covert warfare nan “hidden surge.”

From now on, Iraq would beryllium a warfare of targeted killings carried retired clandestinely, almost ever astatine night. Swollen pinch caller infusions of money, personnel, equipment, and aircraft, JSOC became “JSOC connected steroids,” a “counterterrorism sidesplitting machine” tin of slaying recalcitrant Iraqis connected a standard that some Vickers and McChrystal picture arsenic “industrial.” From astir 10 a period astatine nan commencement of nan war, nan number of nighttime raids that JSOC carried retired accrued to 10 per time astatine nan tallness of nan surge.

McChrystal called this relentless tempo nan “continuous targeting cycle.” Fluent successful McKinsey-style motto for illustration “decision cycle,” “dynamic process,” and “nodal analysis,” he was adept astatine spitting retired pithy truisms specified arsenic “it takes a web to conclusion a network,” and a prolific coiner of acronyms for illustration F3EAD, which stood for Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate.

Despite nan ungainly initialism, nan F3EAD rhythm was not a analyzable concept. It typically meant search down a target, sidesplitting him and each big man and teenage boy successful nan vicinity, seizing each portion of insubstantial and physics instrumentality recovered connected their persons, and utilizing these materials to travel up pinch much names to adhd to nan deed list, and past sidesplitting them too, sometimes conscionable a fewer hours later.

The hidden surge, successful which nan Army constituent of JSOC, known arsenic Delta Force, played nan starring role, was greatly enabled by nan wide take of compartment phones successful Iraq, a technological improvement that coincided pinch nan first fewer years of American occupation. JSOC’s screen-filled office astatine Camp Anaconda received an influx of unit from nan National Security Agency, who recovered it trivial to intercept unencrypted calls connected Iraq’s burgeoning mobile networks, and could easy toggle shape compartment phones into listening devices.

Television and movie depictions of nan Global War connected Terrorism often represent American operators and spies arsenic capable to speak nan section languages, suavely lobbing savvy quotations from nan Koran astatine their truculent Islamist antagonists. But successful a startling admittance pinch sobering implications, McChrystal states successful his memoir that JSOC successful Iraq was “hindered by an almost complete deficiency of Arabic skills wrong our force,” suggesting that astir each of those whom Delta Force killed were targeted not connected nan ground of nan contented of telephonic intercepts, but connected pseudoscientific “nodal analysis,” tips from paid informants, and arbitrary guesswork.

“We were not decease squads,” McChrystal writes. But equipped pinch NSA intercepts, backed by recently developed Reaper drones, and joined by fierce Kurdish mercenaries called Mohawks, that’s precisely what JSOC became during nan covert surge successful Iraq, which lasted into 2008. The assemblage count from Delta Force’s sidesplitting spree, and nan proportionality of Iraq’s hundreds of thousands of warfare dormant who were gunned down successful JSOC nighttime raids, will ne'er beryllium known because it wasn’t recorded successful nan first place. That these events are mislaid to nan humanities and photographic grounds was by design. What Vickers dubs nan “hidden surge” was a broadside of nan Iraq warfare ne'er intended to beryllium seen by nan public, who were fed images of conventional, uniformed troops connected patrol, but ne'er immoderate footage of nan plainclothes men who did astir each of nan nighttime bedewed work.

“From 2006 on, 90 percent aliases higher of insurgent deaths were from targeted, violative SOF operations,” said a erstwhile Delta Force sergeant awesome who served successful Iraq during nan surge, utilizing an acronym that refers to typical operations forces successful general. “Going retired nighttime aft night, connected purpose, and getting successful firefights pinch bad guys—that occupation fell to us.”

Instead of mounting patrols and reacting to occurrence for illustration accepted infantry, Delta Force operators identified their targets from a distance, successful advance, and took them by surprise, often making usage of perfidious techniques specified arsenic disguising themselves arsenic Iraqis, utilizing wigs, brownface, and prosthetics. They posed arsenic Red Cross personnel, United Nations inspectors, occidental businessmen, aliases European diplomats. With nan thief of female support soldiers, they passed themselves disconnected arsenic husband-and-wife pairs, masquerading, for instance, arsenic joined schoolteachers who’d travel to thatch English to Iraqi kids. They moreover copied nan enemy’s strategies and blew up targets pinch roadside bombs.

Among themselves, nan bearded, long-haired operators called each different by their first names, eschewed divisions of rank, and dressed successful a mishmash of civilian attire. When they did deterioration uniforms, nan portion patches they sported were purely fictitious: hometown constabulary badges, nan seals of various states, Spartan helmets, Crusader shields, nan Confederate conflict flag, aliases jokey tabs that said things for illustration “HATCHET FORCE” aliases “FUCK AL QAEDA.”

No camera crews ever went connected nighttime raids pinch Delta Force. Their operations were not nan taxable of news documentaries, nor do we person immoderate oral histories, because soundlessness is nan unit’s main constituent of pride. But complete time, these strictures inevitably loosen, if only a little. In caller years, galore erstwhile typical operators person gone connected podcasts to talk their subject careers successful a definite Army “special ngo unit” aliases “compartmented element.” And once-rare photos of JSOC operations person recovered their measurement onto societal media, including images of Delta Force successful Iraq nether McCrystal’s leadership.

“Several of my rotations to Iraq [were] composed of conscionable my squad and a mini HQ element,” a erstwhile Delta Force unit sergeant awesome named Jesse Boettcher wrote successful an Instagram station dated February 28, 2022. “While I had nan afloat unit of nan US authorities conscionable a power telephone away, location were very fewer of america connected nan crushed getting dirty. Our mini constituent was capable to execute and refine nan full F3EAD rhythm almost daily, pinch very small extracurricular assistance.”

In nan photograph accompanying nan post, Boettcher, past successful his mid-thirties, sits astatine a array dressed successful soiled civilian clothes. In backmost of him is simply a whiteboard. Much of nan penning connected it has been blacked out, but you tin still publication random words, including “meeting,” “explosives,” “liaison,” “interrogation,” and “safehouse.” Taped connected nan wall down nan whiteboard is simply a grid of 55 mugshots of brown-skinned men. Almost each of them person been crossed retired pinch an X.

Another picture, posted January 19, 2022, shows nan remainder of Boettcher’s team, a group of 7 unkempt achromatic men. “It mightiness look for illustration a ragtag bunch of ruffians, but this unit were straight-up Pipe-Hitters,” Boettcher wrote, utilizing an obscure word considered a precocious compliment successful nan typical operations organization that derives from nan conception of a worker who is truthful fearless, daring, and addicted to warfare that he tin beryllium likened to a smoker of ace cocaine. “The guys successful front,” Boettcher wrote, referring to 3 fresh-faced, clean-shaven young men kneeling successful nan foreground, “have killed much group than cancer.”

Excerpt adapted from The Fort Bragg Cartel: Drug Trafficking and Murder successful nan Special Forces by Seth Harp. Published by arrangement with Viking. Copyright © 2025 Seth Harp.